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The Constitution and Human Rights:                          
The International Legal Constructionist                     
Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights 
Francisco Forrest Martin†
INTRODUCTION
The continuing irony for many U.S. human rights advocates is our na-
tion’s claim that the United States is the most free country in the world due 
in large measure to our Constitution while at the same time our government 
goes about undermining and violating human rights at home and abroad.1
Particularly troubling is the U.S. government’s failure to live up to its inter-
national human rights legal obligations. If we are to have, as John Adams 
said, “a government of laws, not men,” then our government should be act-
ing in conformity with its human rights legal obligations both national and 
international.2
Two major developments in constitutional interpretation have contrib-
uted to this frustration of achieving the full human rights protection pro-
vided by international law.3  First, the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth 
century repeatedly held in a number of cases upholding anti-immigrant and 
anti-Native-American federal legislation that Congress could void a treaty 
by enacting a new law.4  Second, federal courts have declared that some 
 † President, Rights International, The Center for International Human Rights Law, Inc. 
1
 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2005: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS
(2005); THE HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2005 (2005). 
2
 VII Novanglus [John Adams], A History of the Dispute with America, From Its Origin, in 1754 
to the Present Time (1774), in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 226 (C. Bradley 
Thompson ed., 2001). 
3
 This Article will not address how constitutional interpretation has failed to incorporate interna-
tional human rights legal standards in various substantive areas, such as the death penalty, privacy, or 
due process.  Such a treatment already has been provided elsewhere.  See, e.g., FRANCISCO FORREST 
MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS
(2001) [hereinafter MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS].  This Article will address 
more formal issues challenging the incorporation of international human rights law in U.S. constitu-
tional law. 
4
 See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870) (breaking treaty with Cherokee 
nation by charging tax on tobacco); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (breaking friendship 
treaties by charging head tax on entering aliens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(breaking treaty with China by excluding Chinese immigrants); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) 
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treaty norms are non-self-executing.5  Such norms require implementing 
legislation for the courts to enforce them.  
This Essay will argue that these two obstacles can be overcome by 
embracing a somewhat new paradigm of constitutional interpretation—one 
that recognizes that the Constitution is a treaty that must be construed in 
conformity with the United States’ international legal obligations per the 
conventional law of nations.6  This interpretive approach is called “Interna-
tional Legal Constructionism” (“ILC”), which has been presented in an 
earlier article.7  ILC is not really new.  The Founding Fathers and Framers 
effectively ascribed to it.  However, it appears to have become lost over the 
last 150 years in part due to the nationalist victory in the Civil War and the 
United States’ growing hegemony in international relations.  Nevertheless, 
if constitutionalists are serious about ensuring human rights protections, we 
need to return to this original paradigm of constitutional understanding—
especially in the new globalized world order. 
I. THE LAST-IN-TIME RULE
The “Last-in-Time” Rule states that a federal statute can supercede a 
treaty obligation if the statute was enacted after the ratification of the treaty. 
The Rule also states that a federal statute is trumped by a later ratified 
treaty.  Both statements of the Rule are premised on the claim that federal 
statutes and treaties have equal legal authority under the Constitution.  The 
Rule continues to vex human rights advocates, as evidenced by the Su-
preme Court’s 1998 ruling in Breard v. Greene8 in which the Court denied 
petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus in part on the basis that the 
(breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by denying self-government); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 
U.S. 445 (1899) (breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by taking land). 
5
 See, e.g.,  Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring rights 
provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights non-self-executing); Ralk v. 
Lincoln Country, Georgia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (same); Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. 
Supp. 2d 27, 43 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); White v. Paulsen,  997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (E.D. Wash. 1998) 
(same); In the Matter of the Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997) (same). 
6
 The conventional law of nations is the international law governing the interpretation of treaties.  
Much of this international law is codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15, 25 I.L.M. 543  [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention-SIO]. 
7
 For a fuller discussion of International Legal Constructionism, see Francisco Forrest Martin, 
Our Constitution as Federal Treaty: A New Theory of United States Constitutional Construction Based 
on an Originalist Understanding for Addressing a New World, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. QUART. 259-354 
(2004) [hereinafter, Martin, Our Constitution as Federal Treaty]. 
8
 523 U.S. 371 (1998).  In late 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to re-examine the United 
States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in another case.  See Medellin v. 
Dretke, No. 04-5928 (rev. grant.).  However, the Court later dismissed the writ of certiorari in this case 
as improvidently granted. 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005) (per curiam) (slip opinion). 
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)9 superceded the 
earlier ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that guaran-
teed foreign nationals the right to consular assistance when they are ar-
rested.10
I submit that the Last-in-Time Rule is an unconstitutional and immoral 
judge-made rule on a number of grounds. First, the Rule’s application in 
many cases can violate the constitutional separation of powers principle by 
nullifying the President’s authority to make treaties that have the status of 
federal law.11  Although Congress can make federal statutory law without 
the President’s approval if the legislation acquires two-thirds votes in each 
House,12 it is different with treaties.  The President’s approval is necessary 
to a treaty becoming part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”  The House of 
Representative’s approval is not required for a treaty to be supreme law.  
Therefore, the House of Representatives has no role in either making or un-
making treaties.  Allowing a federal statute to supercede an earlier ratified 
treaty would nullify the President’s constitutional co-authority with the 
Senate to make federal law, thereby violating the separation of powers prin-
ciple.   
The only two arguable applications of the Last-in-Time Rule that 
would not run afoul of the separation of powers principles are when (i) both 
the President and two-thirds of the Senate approve legislation that conflicts 
with an earlier ratified treaty, and (ii) the President and Senate make a treaty 
that conflicts with earlier legislation enacted over a President’s veto. 
However, even these last case scenarios still would create a conflict 
with the text of the Constitution, thereby raising a second problem with the 
Last-in-Time Rule.  The text of the Supremacy Clause indicates that treaties 
have greater authority than federal statutory law.  Treaties are made under 
the authority of the United States,13 and such authority precedes the estab-
lishment of our constitutional government as the text of the Supremacy 
Clause indicates by recognizing the continuing supreme legal authority of 
treaties made under the Articles of Confederation. The United States legally 
could dissolve the Constitution (as it did earlier with the Articles of Con-
9
 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2254(a)-(e)(2) (Supp. 1998). 
10
 Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. 
11
 See U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2 (Sept. 17, 1787; entered into force June 21, 1788) (President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur”) [hereinafter U.S. CONST.]; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“[A]ll Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
12
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
13
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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federation—but this time by unanimous state consent)14 and establish a new 
form of government.  If it did so, treaties would continue to bind the United 
States (as they did under the Constitution).  
On the other hand, federal statutes are only made in pursuance of the 
Constitution.15  The authority of federal statutes relies solely upon the Con-
stitution.  If the United States dissolved the Constitution and established a 
new constitution, federal statutes enacted in pursuance of the old Constitu-
tion would no longer be valid (unless the new constitution provided so).  
Most importantly, if Congress enacts a federal statute on subject-
matter that exceeds the powers explicitly delegated to the political 
branches16 or enacts a federal statute that violates substantive provisions of 
the Constitution,17 such federal statutes are constitutionally invalid.   On the 
other hand, treaties constitutionally can govern matters not explicitly ad-
dressed in the Constitution because there is no subject-matter limitation on 
the treaty-making authority of the President and Senate in the Constitution. 
For example, Congress could not enact a law that violates a treaty guaran-
teeing the right to explore Mars for scientific purposes because Congress 
has no apparent enumerated power to prohibit scientific exploration in outer 
space.  In such a case, the treaty has greater constitutional authority than a 
federal statute. 
The only arguable constitutional limitation on the treaty power, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert held,18 is that treaties cannot violate 
the Constitution.19  Indeed, this holding is consistent with international law.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows a state to nullify a 
treaty if the treaty manifestly violates a fundamental rule of its internal law, 
such as its constitution.20  Furthermore, in the context of international hu-
14
 Non-unanimity was legally sufficient for ratifying the Constitution because state violations of 
the Articles and the failure of the states to use federal courts for resolving allegations of state Articles 
violations enabled the United States to adopt a nine-state rule for ratifying the Constitution. See Martin,
Our Constitution as Federal Treaty, supra note 7 at 283-91.  Furthermore, a constitutional amendment 
probably would be insufficient because all states are parties to the Constitution, and the ratification of 
only three-fourths of the states is required for an amendment to go into force. U.S. CONST. art. V. There-
fore, unanimous state consent would be required in order to dissolve the Constitution. 
15
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Law of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land”). 
16
 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (federal statute allowing line-item 
veto held unconstitutional because veto exceeds political branches’ constitutional powers). 
17
 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803) (federal statute in violation of 
Constitution is void). 
18
 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957). 
19
 For example, a treaty governing space exploration could not violate the Constitution because 
the Constitution does not address space exploration—unless the treaty violated, e.g., the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause by requiring summary executions of astronauts who attempt to pirate the 
space vessel. Interestingly enough, however, no U.S. court has ever found any treaty unconstitutional. 
20
 See Vienna Convention, art. 46 (1) (“A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence 
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man rights legal protections, the Vienna Convention also says that treaties 
cannot violate human rights and humanitarian law protections.21
Therefore, if treaties have greater constitutional authority then federal 
statutes, then the Last-in-Time Rule’s assumption that federal statutes have 
equal constitutional authority with treaties, is invalid. 
A third problem with the Last-in-Time Rules is that early U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent also indicated that treaties could not be violated.  In 
The Antelope, the Court in 1812 noted that treaties could not be violated. 
In almost every instance, the treaties between civilized nations contain 
a stipulation to this effect in favor of vessels driven in by stress of 
weather or other urgent necessity. In such cases the sovereign is bound 
by compact to authorize foreign vessels to enter his ports. The treaty 
binds him to allow vessels in distress to find refuge and asylum in his 
ports, and this is a license which he is not at liberty to retract.22
Fifty-two years later, the Supreme Court failed to address this earlier 
dictum and reversed itself by fabricating the Last-in-Time Rule.  In doing 
so, the Court legitimized a continuing legacy of racial discrimination 
against Native-Americans and aliens23 that later culminated  in the Court’s 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision against African-Americans.24 For example, in  
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Supreme Court in allowing Congress 
to break a U.S.-China treaty guaranteeing Chinese immigration to the 
United States stated that “the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful 
effect upon the material interests of the state, and upon public morals; that 
their immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental 
invasion, and was a menace to our civilization.”25 Seven years later, the 
Court would extend its racism to African-Americas in Plessy v. Ferguson by 
facetiously asserting that “[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, [the sepa-
ration of Whites and Negroes], in places where they are liable to be brought 
into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the 
other . . . .”26
to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
its internal law of fundamental importance.”); Vienna Convention-SIO, art. 46. 
21
 Vienna Convention, art. 60 (5) (breach of human rights or humanitarian treaty by state-party 
does not entitle other state-party to terminate or suspend operation of treaty). 
22
 See The Antelope, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812) (emphasis provided). 
23
 See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870) (breaking treaty with Cherokee 
nation by charging tax on tobacco); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (breaking friendship 
treaties by charging head tax on entering aliens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(breaking treaty with China by excluding Chinese immigrants); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) 
(breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by denying self-government); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 
U.S. 445 (1899) (breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by taking land). 
24
 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
25
 130 U.S. 581, 595. 
26
 163 U.S. 537, 544 . 
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Indeed, this discrimination against Native Americans and aliens runs 
afoul of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.  Al-
though the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee only ap-
plies, strictly speaking, to the states,27 the Supreme Court later has inter-
preted the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process protections to in-
clude the right to equal protection of the laws—especially in regard to 
aliens.28  Such an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment also is consonant 
with earlier Supreme Court precedent that held that the United States’ treaty 
obligations should be construed liberally in order to avoid conflicts with our 
treaty-partners whose nationals could otherwise be the subject of harmful 
alienage discrimination.29  Accordingly, any federal statute that discrimi-
nates against aliens by voiding previous treaty obligations protecting them 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny at the very least.30
A fourth problem with the Last-in-Time Rule is that unnecessarily 
overreaches to flatly assert that the Congress constitutionally could void 
treaties anytime that it wished by later enacting legislation.  International 
law itself allows states to void, suspend, or withdraw from treaty obliga-
tions on a number of grounds.  For example, material breach by a treaty 
partner and fraud are lawful grounds for abrogating a treaty; a fundamental 
change of circumstances is a lawful ground for withdrawing from a treaty; 
and treaty suspension or withdrawal may be allowed by the treaty itself.31
Although states have inherent sovereignty (including the right to de-
termine who can and cannot immigrate32 as was the case with the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases33), this sovereignty is limited by the sovereign’s own ca-
pacity to impose self-limits by entering into treaties or acceding to emerg-
ing customary international legal obligations.  Sovereignty is not a trump 
card for getting out of one’s legal obligations when s/he has the predilection 
to do so. 
27
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
28
 See Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (federal alienage discrimination violative of 5th 
Amendment guarantee prohibiting denial of liberty without due process of law). 
29
 See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (“It is a general principle of construction with 
respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the 
parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.”). 
30
 Cf. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (strict scrutiny test applied to state discrimination on 
basis of alienage). 
31
 See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 2 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN § 202 (1758) (treaty 
breach) [hereinafter, VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS]; id. at § 296 (change of circumstances); Vienna Conven-
tion, arts. 54 (termination or withdrawal allowed by treaty), 60 (breach), and 62 (fundamental change of 
circumstances). 
32
 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
33
 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 595. 
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The fifth problem with the Last-in-Time Rule is its conflict with the 
Framers’ claim that treaties were supreme over federal statutory law. For 
example, Alexander Hamilton stated that it was “understood by all” during 
the Constitutional Convention that the Constitution’s treaty power was 
“competent to . . . controul and bind the legislative power of Congress” and 
that “no objection was made to the idea of its controuling future exercises 
of the legislative power.”34  John Jay gave one reason why federal statutes 
could not supercede the United States’ treaty obligations:  
They who make laws, may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and 
it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel 
them; but still, let us not forget, that treaties are made, not by only one 
of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the 
consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever 
afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, 
therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They 
are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legisla-
tive acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form 
of government.35
William Davie went further and stated that treaties were supreme over fed-
eral statutes: 
[A]lthough treaties are mere conventional acts between the contracting 
parties, yet, by the law of nations, they are the supreme law of the land 
to their respective citizens or subjects. All civilized nations have con-
curred in considering them as paramount to an ordinary act of legisla-
tion.36
A sixth reason for rejecting the Last-in-Time Rule is that when the 
U.S. government violates its treaty obligations with its treaty partners, these 
states-parties under the conventional law of nations can lawfully abrogate 
their international legal obligations with the American people (with the ex-
ception of humanitarian or human rights norms).  Such action by the U.S. 
government would violate the social contract established by the American 
people, and we should recall that violations of international law by the Brit-
ish Parliament constituted one of the justifications for breaking our ties with 
Great Britain mentioned in the Declaration of Independence.37
34
 Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. 38 (1795), in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
22, 25 n.* (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974). 
35
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (Jay John) at ¶ 12 (1788). 
36
 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 119 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
37
 See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (dissolution of social contract with Great Britain 
justified on bases of Britain’s “cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world. . . . [and the] . . . plun-
43
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The seventh reason is that the need for the Last-in-Time Rule is prem-
ised on a false notion of Congressional Supremacy. The Constitution does 
not explicitly incorporate the Last-in-Time Rule; therefore, one must at-
tempt to provide a justification of it on the basis of some general constitu-
tional principle extrapolated from the text of the Constitution.  The obvious 
choice is a principle of Congressional Supremacy in lawmaking extrapo-
lated from Article I that states “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in 
[the] Congress . . . .”  The notion of Congressional Supremacy in lawmak-
ing appears to be derived from the British principle of Parliamentary Su-
premacy, and the British Parliamentary Supremacy Principle requires the 
use of a last-in-time rule that always allows Parliament to reverse its own 
supreme laws.  
However, a comparison of purported Congressional Supremacy with 
Parliamentary Supremacy highlights how the Last-in-Time Rule’s applica-
tion to treaties is based on the false premise of Congressional Supremacy. 
Insofar as the American Last-in-Time Rule is premised on the basis of its 
need to ensure Congressional Supremacy, the premise for this justification 
is false. The United States rejected the British constitutional principle of 
Parliamentary Supremacy by declaring its independence from Great Britain 
and forming governments under the Articles of Confederation and the Con-
stitution that did not make their respective Congresses supreme. The 
American Last-in-Time Rule itself makes Congressional supremacy impos-
sible by allowing the President (with the consent of the Senate) to make a 
treaty that supercedes an earlier Congressionally enacted federal statute.   If 
there is no valid constitutional principle upon which to justify the Last-in-
Time Rule, the Rule is the mere product of judges exercising a political 
predilection in favor of Congress.38
der[ing of] our seas.”). The law of nations guarantees freedom of trade and the seas.  See, e.g., HUGO 
GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS ch. 12 (1609). 
38
 Furthermore, the American Last-in-Time Rule is a corruption of the British last-in-time rule 
because treaties under British constitutional law never have domestic legal effect (without acts of Par-
liament giving them such effect). This is not the case with U.S. constitutional law in which treaties often 
do have domestic legal effect without the need for implementing legislation.  See infra discussion in Part 
2. Therefore, the British last-in-time rule is inapplicable to British treaties because they do not have 
equal legal status with acts of Parliament.  The British last-in-time rule only applies to acts of Parlia-
ment, whereas the American Last-in-Time Rule applies to both statutes and treaties. 
On the other hand, one may argue that the American Last-in-Time Rule is just an adaptation—not a 
corrupted version—of the British rule to the peculiar American constitutional scheme purportedly mak-
ing treaties equal to statutes, which British constitutional law does not.  If Parliament in the future were 
to enact legislation stating that all treaties have equal status to acts of Parliament and subsequently 
enacts a statute violating one of these treaties, this statute would be constitutional under the British last-
in-time rule only because of the Parliamentary Supremacy Principle. Hence, a last-in-time rule would be 
applicable.  However, if Congress were to enact a statute inconsistent with an earlier ratified U.S. treaty, 
the application of a last-in-time rule to supercede the treaty could not be based on a rule of Congres-
sional supremacy because the President still later could make a treaty superseding this statute. Again, 
there is no Congressional supremacy upon which to base the Last-in-Time Rule’s application to treaties. 
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Most importantly, the eighth and final reason for rejecting the Last-in-
Time Rule is that fundamental morality dictates that we keep our promises.  
We teach our children that they should keep their promises unless the prom-
ise itself is wrong or circumstances have changed that would lead to greater 
harms.  It is the same with treaties in which our elected representatives en-
ter into agreements with other peoples (i.e., nations) on our behalf and with 
our constructive consent. This is a lesson that the Supreme Court never 
learned. 
Although we have discussed textual, historical, jurisprudential, politi-
cal, and moral reasons for rejecting the Last-in-Time Rule, there is a more 
direct route for such a rejection by means of construing the Constitution in 
conformity with the United States’ international legal obligations.   Per the 
ILC approach, Congress’ constitutional authority under Article I, § 8 to 
enact legislation must be construed in conformity with international law, 
and international law prohibits states from failing to perform their treaty 
obligations.39  If such an approach is taken, the Last-in-Time Rule’s applica-
tion to earlier ratified treaties is no longer constitutional.40
39
 Vienna Convention, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justi-
fication for its failure to perform a treaty. . . .”). 
40
 Also, recent federal court practice seems to suggest that federal statutes and executive orders 
always trump customary international law regardless of when it emerged.  See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 86 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal statute supercedes customary 
international law); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (federal statute supercedes customary international law); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 
(5th Cir. 1986) (federal statute supercedes customary international law); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 
1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (federal statutes and executive orders supercede customary international 
law);United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982) (federal statute supercedes customary 
international law); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (federal statute supercedes customary 
international law).   
However, this recent, judge-made rule is also fraught with insurmountable problems, such as its ba-
sis on a paraphrasing of dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court’s The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900) (dictum) (“where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations”) that is overreaching.  For 
example, some federal courts have overreached the dictum’s meaning by adding the word “only,” as in 
“only ‘where there is not treaty, and not controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”  In the Matter of the Extradition of 
Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n. 17 (D. Conn. 1997); see also Dimon-Sainz v. United States, No. 97-
3117-RDR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18582 (D. Kan. 1999) (same); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959) (same). 
The application of the Last-in-Time Rule to customary international law also fails to recognize ear-
lier conflicting case law and authorities. See, e.g., Macintosh v. United States, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) 
(dictum) (Congress under war powers authority cannot violate international law); see also Jordan Paust, 
Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the 
Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 393 (1988), for additional authorities 
cited therein. 
The Rule’s application to customary international law also mischaracterizes customary international 
law as merely common law that can be superceded by statute. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution 
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 
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II. THE NON-SELF-EXECUTION DOCTRINE
The second obstacle facing human rights protective constitutional con-
struction is the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine.  Mr. Chief Justice John Mar-
shall articulated this doctrine in Foster v. Neilson41 in 1829. Marshall stated 
that those treaties addressed “to the political, not the judicial department” 
are non-self-executing.42  Therefore, “the legislature must execute the con-
tract (i.e., the treaty) before [the treaty] can become a rule for the Court.”43
Like the Last-in-Time Rule, the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine appears to 
have been borrowed from the British constitutional concept of Parliamen-
tary Supremacy in that the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine ensures that legis-
lative action by Parliament is required before treaty obligations can be per-
formed.  Otherwise, British treaties—which can be made only by the 
Crown—could have domestic legal effect that conflict with acts of Parlia-
ment, thereby destroying Parliamentary Supremacy.   
Insofar as the United States rejected the Parliamentary Supremacy 
Principle and the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine prevents courts enforcing 
treaties without implementing legislation, this Doctrine relies on an inappli-
cable British constitutional principle. Article III gives the federal courts the 
power to decide all cases arising under treaties,44 and the Supremacy Clause 
requires that state judges be bound by treaties.45  In the context of human 
rights treaties that guarantee domestic remedies (including judicial ones),46
(1987) [hereinafter Henkin, Chinese Exclusion] (disputing customary international law as being only 
federal common law). Evidence of much of modern customary international law is found in treaties.  
The Rule’s application also displaces customary international law with treaty law as a superior au-
thority of law.  If federal statutes as well as treaties have equal authority—as the Last-in-Time rule 
holds—then treaties trump customary international law.  However, this inference generally would vio-
late international law because one cannot make a new treaty that violates an extant customary interna-
tional legal norm (unless all states that have acceded to the customary international legal norm are also 
states-parties to the new treaty). 
And—again—the Rule’s application would conflict with the original understanding of the Foun-
ders. See supra discussion.  Also, the Rule’s application has produced absurd results, such as indefinite 
detention. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (indefinite detention).  There-
fore, this rule has serious constitutional infirmities; however, again, such a rule would be unconstitu-
tional under ILC when the President’s authority to issue executive orders and approve legislation, and 
the Congress’ authority to make law is construed in conformity with United States’ customary interna-
tional legal obligations. 
41
 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
42
 Id. at 314. 
43
 Id.
44
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under . . . Treaties . . . .”). 
45
 U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause). 
46
 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . 
. . [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy,  . . . [t]o ensure that any such person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
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this problem is highlighted because the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine un-
dermines the constitutional status of treaties as law of the land, the violation 
of which is not remediable in the courts.  
Nevertheless, since Foster v. Neilson, federal courts have declared that 
some treaty obligations are non-self-executing.47 Such treaty obligations 
require implementing legislation before the federal courts can give them 
domestic effect.  Assuming the constitutional legitimacy of the Non-Self-
Execution Doctrine, whether a particular treaty constitutionally requires 
implementing legislation should turn on whether its particular provisions 
constitutionally require implementing legislation. Certain treaty provisions 
may be vague requiring federal legislation to provide definition.  However, 
in the context of human rights treaties, their substantive rights guarantees 
should not constitutionally require legislative definition.  Like the many of 
human rights guarantees in the Bill of Rights, such rights are self-executing, 
and although Congress may enact legislation giving further definition to 
such international legal norms under its constitutional authority to define 
offences against the law of nations,48 the federal courts also have a say—
indeed, for the Supreme Court, the final say—on their definition.49  Con-
gress may be constitutionally50 required to set penalties51 for violations of a 
treaty’s provisions52 that the treaty requires but failed to explicitly set.  
Other treaty provisions53 may require Congress to provide an explicit pri-
vate cause of action for the violations of the provisions.54
However, if Congress fails to enact legislation giving domestic effect 
to the treaty’s obligations, then there should be a presumption that no such 
legislation is constitutionally needed;55 otherwise, the members of Congress 
thereto determined by a competent judicial . . . authorit[y], . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial 
remedy . . . .”) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
47
 Federal courts also have extended the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine to include some customary 
international legal norms.  See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736 (2004) (indicating 
need for federal legislation to give customary international legal norms domestic effect) (dictum). 
48
 U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 10. 
49
 Cf. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Supreme Court—not Congress—determines final 
meaning of federal law). 
50
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress has power to punish offences against the law of 
nations). 
51
 See, e.g., “War Crimes Act of 1996,” 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (implementing penalty legislation for 
Hague and Geneva Conventions). 
52
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1950) (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal provisions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the 
prsent Convention . . . .”) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
53
 See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 2. 
54
 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (guaranteeing writ of habeas corpus to prisoners being de-
tained in violation of treaties). 
55
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, n.5 (1987) 
(“[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted 
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have failed to comply with their constitutional duty under Article VI to sup-
port the Constitution,56 specifically by failing “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States . . . .”57 that includes legislation necessary for the im-
plementation of the President’s and Senate’s joint treaty-making power un-
der Article II.58
In the area of human rights, the United States ratified the ICCPR and 
deposited a declaration stating that the substantive human rights guarantees 
contained in Articles 1-27 of the ICCPR were non-self-executing.59  The 
United States also has deposited a similar declaration60 when it ratified the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).61  The constitutionality of such non-self-
execution declarations have been the subject of much academic discus-
sion.62  Furthermore, it is not even clear what exactly the Bush Administra-
tion and the Senate meant by “non-self-executing” in relation to the ICCPR
and CAT.63  Some federal and state courts often have provided the most 
sweeping definition to the term by holding that the declaration effectively 
guts the treaty by denying any enforcement of the treaty’s human rights by 
the courts.64  The treaty’s human rights obligations do not in any way bind 
such legislation, there is a strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the 
political branches, and should be considered self-executing by the courts.”). 
56
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned . . . and all 
executive and judicial Officers . . . of the United States . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution . . . .”). 
57
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
58
 See U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nomi-
nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”). 
59
 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as AT 31 DEC. 1992, at 132, 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11 (1993). 
60
 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 DEC. 1994, at 185, 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13 (1995). 
61
 Adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 
197 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987) 
62
 See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing 
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999) [hereinafter Sloss, Domestica-
tion]; Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to Condition Its Con-
sent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1991); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT’L L. 760 (1988). 
63
 See Sloss, Domestication at 153 (“The Bush Administration presented different explanations at 
different times, shifting back and forth between the Foster concept and the ‘private cause of action 
concept.’”). 
64
 See, e.g.,  Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring rights 
provisions in ICCPR non-self-executing); Ralk v. Lincoln Country, Georgia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000) (same); Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); White v. Paulsen, 
997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (same); In the Matter of the Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 
791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997) (same). 
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the states or the federal government.  This is particularly striking in the case 
of state courts holding that the ICCPR does not bind the states because the 
Supremacy Clause expressly requires that state court judges are “bound” to 
apply this “supreme Law.”65  For example, the Nevada Supreme Court in 
Domingues v. Nevada held that the ICCPR’s prohibition of juvenile execu-
tions did not bind the State of Nevada because the Senate had declared that 
provision of the treaty to be non-self-executing.66 Although a treaty may 
allow states to exercise a certain margin of appreciation in how they go 
about complying with their treaty obligations,67 it is a wholly different mat-
ter to say that a court cannot give the treaty’s obligations any legal effect 
whatsoever without implementing legislation.  To implement this latter 
claim effectively voids the legal nature of the treaty in violation of interna-
tional law68 and the U.S. Constitution.69
In the situation of the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine’s application to the 
federal government, federal courts have held some treaties to be self-
executing.70  Even those constitutional scholars who have set forth the ex-
tremist argument that most treaties should be presumed to require imple-
menting legislation have not dared venture to argue that all treaties have no 
legally binding authority under the U.S. constitutional scheme.71 After all, 
the Supremacy Clause clearly eliminates that possibility by making treaties 
part of the supreme law of the land. 
The controversy over the constitutionality of such non-self-execution 
declarations already appears to have adversely affected Supreme Court ju-
risprudence.  In Lawrence v. Texas,72 the Supreme Court appeared to want to 
avoid the controversy by not citing the UN Human Rights Committee’s 
decision in Toonen v. Australia,73 which held that the right to privacy guar-
anteed by the ICCPR extended to the protection of homosexual conduct.  
By not citing Toonen—a case particularly on point—the Court appeared to 
want to avoid addressing the issue of whether the ICCPR is indeed non-
65
 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
66
 Domingues v. State, 114 Nev. 783 (Nev. 1998). 
67
 See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) (allowing state-party 
to European Convention on Human Rights to exercise a margin of appreciation in protecting morals of 
children). 
68
 Vienna Convention, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justi-
fication for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
69
 U.S. CONST. art. VI (treaties are part of the supreme law of the land). 
70
 See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (holding that treaty earlier 
found to be non-self-executing in Foster v. Neilson was self-executing according to Spanish version). 
71
 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:  Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1962 (1999) (“original understanding does not 
definitively show that all treaties must be non-self-executing”). 
72
 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
73
 Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Hum. Rts. Ctte., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488 (1994) 
(right to privacy includes right to engage in homosexual conduct under ICCPR). 
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self-executing as the President and Senate declared.  However, whether the 
ICCPR is self-executing or not is not relevant because the Texas anti-
sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence did not implicate the separation of 
powers principle that undergirds the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court is not demanding action from any political branch of 
the federal government that would violate the separation of powers princi-
ple.   The Supremacy Clause disposes the issue by explicitly requiring state 
courts to comply with the United States’ treaty obligations.  
Instead, the Court cited several European Court of Human Rights deci-
sions that interpreted the European Convention of Human Rights’ guarantee 
of the right to privacy to include the protection of homosexual conduct.74
In doing so, the Court effectively opted to employ a treaty to which the 
United States is not a party in construing our Constitution.  This move un-
necessarily strengthened the hand of those who see some judges as improp-
erly using purportedly “foreign law” in construing the Constitution.75  This 
issue avoidance now has resulted with the Supreme Court accepting the 
non-self-execution declaration without any critical analysis.76
However, the constitutional controversy over such non-self-execution 
declarations and the Non-Self-Execution Doctrine itself can be circum-
vented by employing the ILC approach.  Again, the solution to ensure that 
human rights guaranteed by international law are given effect is to construe 
the human rights provisions of the Constitution in conformity with this in-
ternational law.  For example, the human rights guaranteed by the first eight 
Amendments are self-executing.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court already has 
noted that the privileges and immunities guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment include those guaranteed by treaty.78 Therefore, construing 
these constitutionally guaranteed human rights in conformity with the 
United States’ human rights treaty obligations gives effect to this interna-
tional human rights law. Even  those human rights treaties that the United 
States has declared to be non-self-executing can be used as evidence of the 
United States’ explicit acceptance of customary international law norms 
codified in such treaties.  Such customary international law can be used to 
74
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Modinos v. 
Cyprus, and Norris v. Ireland). 
75
 Supreme Court justices (whether supportive or non-supportive of the use of international law) 
also often refer to international law merely as “world opinion” or “foreign law” in an apparent attempt 
distance themselves from such a mandatory construction.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 
1200 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,) (referring to international law as “world opinion”); id. at 1229 (Scalia. J., 
dissenting) (referring to international law as “foreign law”). 
76
 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 (“[A]lthough the [ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of 
international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not 
self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”) (dictum). 
77
 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (“first eight Amendments to the Constitution 
set forth self executing prohibitions on governmental action”). 
78
 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). 
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construe the human rights guarantees in the Constitution because the Con-
stitution as a treaty must be construed in conformity with customary inter-
national law according to the conventional law of nations.79
Furthermore, in cases where the Constitution’s language is silent on 
other human rights (such as privacy and the right to travel), the Ninth 
Amendment80 can be construed in conformity with international human 
rights law that does explicitly guarantee such rights.81  Such an international 
legal construction is essential for recognizing human rights that are not ex-
plicitly mentioned in the Constitution and, as a result, are often not pro-
tected.82  Accordingly, one can make an end-run around the issue of non-
self-execution by using the ILC approach because the issue of requiring 
implementing legislation is made moot.83
CONCLUSION
Over the last two hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court has fabri-
cated two weapons whose use by the United States often makes it an outlaw 
in the international community: the Last-in-Time Rule and the Non-Self-
Execution Doctrine.  The latter weapon allows double-dealing by, on the 
79
 See Vienna Convention, art. 31(3)(c) (treaty must be interpreted in light of “any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”); Vienna Convention-SIO, art. 
31(3)(c) (treaty between intergovernmental organization and state must be interpreted in light of  “any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”); Geofroy v. Riggs, 
133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (meaning of treaty language “to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as under-
stood in the public law of nations”); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (1971) (“an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied 
within the framework of the [international juridical] system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”); 
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of 
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. Ser. A, No. 10, at ¶ 37 (1989) (same); Coard v. United States, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/11.06, doc 3 rev (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/ 
Merits/UnitedStates10.951.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (same). 
80
 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”). Ninth Amendment rights are enforceable 
in federal and state courts.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy 
enforceable in federal court); In re Sherol, 581 P.2d 884 (Okla. 1978) (9th Amendment right to respect 
for family integrity enforceable in state court); Voichahoske v. City of Grand Island, 194 Neb. 175 
(1975) (9th Amendment right to marry enforceable in state court). 
81
 See, e.g., ICCPR, arts. 12 (right to privacy) and 13 (right to travel); see also MARTIN,
CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 64-65; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth 
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975). 
82
 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no privacy right to engage in homosexual 
conduct under the 4th and 5th Amendments), rev’d in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. 
83
 In civil cases involving federal defendants accused of constitutional violations as construed by 
the United States’ international legal obligations per the ILC Rule, plaintiffs can use a Bivens/Bolling
action for seeking damages and/or injunctive relief. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 402 
U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing private cause of action for 4th Amendment violations); Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (recognizing private right to injunctive relief for 5th Amendment violations). 
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one hand, agreeing to be bound by a treaty and, on the other hand, reserving 
the right to not give the treaty any effect.  The former allows the United 
States to blatantly cast aside its treaty law obligations without any reason 
whenever it wishes to do so.  Both weapons facilitate assaults on the rule of 
law.  However, the implementation of ILC ensures that constitutional inter-
pretation remains faithful to the rule of international law and rejects the 
hegemonic hypocrisy of an armed thug that struts of the international com-
munity demanding its neighbors to obey the law while it violates it. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court already repeatedly has used interna-
tional law as persuasive authority in construing different constitutional pro-
visions,84 the Court recently has attempted to distance itself from a constitu-
tional construction with international law that is mandatory.  For example, 
in Roper v. Simmons,85 the Court stated that the international law that it used 
to construe the Eighth Amendment was not controlling.  Such international 
law merely provided a “respected and significant confirmation” of the 
Court’s conclusions.86  The Court’s decision in Roper is particularly trou-
bling because unlike Lawrence in which the Court relied only upon case 
law that can properly be used only as confirmation of the Court’s constitu-
tional (i.e., treaty) interpretation according to the conventional law of na-
tions,87 the Roper Court used an explicit prohibition in a treaty to which the 
United States is a party—but only as confirmation of the correctness of its 
constitutional interpretation. The Roper Court should have used the 
84
 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing European Court of Human Rights case law); Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for construing 14th Amendment’s equal protection 
guarantee in support of affirmative action program); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 16 n.21 (2002) 
(citing amicus brief from European Union in McCarver v. North Carolina); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, n.34 (1988) (citing ICCPR for construing 8th Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment in prohibiting execution of persons under the age of 16 committing capital crimes); 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963) (citing Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights for construing 5th and 6th Amendment in citizenship revocation case). 
85
 125 S. Ct. 1183, (2005) (construing 8th Amendment in conformity with international law). 
86
 Id. at 1200. 
87
 Although international courts cite their own precedents, decisions made by international courts, 
strictly speaking, only bind the parties to the case. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (“The decision of the [ICJ] has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Case law is only 
used as a subsidiary means of interpreting treaties. ICJ Statute, art. 38 (1)(d) (ICJ shall apply “subject to 
the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions . . . , as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law”).   
However, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recently has recognized the binding character of 
case law of the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights upon all EU member 
states. See  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preamble, ¶ 5, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 2000) (“This Charter reaffirms . . . the rights as they result, in particular, from 
. . . the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of 
Human Rights.”). 
2006] The Constitution and Human Rights 87
ICCPR’s explicit prohibition of juvenile executions88 as a mandatory legal 
authority for construing the Eighth Amendment.  In attempting to take the 
middle road between a mandatory international legal construction and a 
construction that disregards international law altogether, by characterizing 
the use of such international law as only “persuasive,” the Supreme Court 
unfortunately has driven itself into a conceptual dead end that compromises 
the integrity and coherence of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.  
Only by recognizing that the Constitution is a treaty that must be construed 
in conformity with the United States’ international legal obligations can the 
Court firmly justify its reliance upon international law.  And, most impor-
tantly, only can such a recognition ensure that those human rights protec-
tions guaranteed by international law are guaranteed also by the Constitu-
tion.
88
 See ICCPR, art. 6(5). 
48
